C. ... AND RESIZING THE EU'S ACTIONS TO MEET ITS SECURITY NEEDS
The baskets of 'resilience' and 'partnerships' highlighted in the Strategic Compass place this exercise in the context of a 360° geopolitical approach, which would give the EU all the attributes of a major power.
1. 'Resilience', a necessary and consensual objective
The growing list of unconventional threats justifies supporting the concept of 'resilience', the Strategic Compass's second 'basket' . First used in physics, then in psychology, this term is now understood as referring to the capability of any entity to return to its initial state after a shock.
For the EU, its content remains largely undetermined and is the subject of much debate. But everything leads us to believe that this basket will help advance the Strategic Compass. It is the receptacle for relatively new ideas that work towards a consensual objective, if resilience is understood as contributing to the EU's autonomy as part of a reflection on security that is relatively impervious to crisis management , which is linked to a CSDP that elicits much more caution.
However, many resilience issues raise defence questions , especially from the point of view of securing access to shared assets , which France is keen to highlight.
• Under the banner of resilience, the issue of digital technology, which is fundamental to the security of the EU in its broadest sense , comes up very often. Whether the issue is cybersecurity (see below), artificial intelligence or data storage, 65 ( * ) this field permeates all areas of defence and security. Europe is now clear-eyed about the range of opportunities, but also the threats, that digital technology offers. This is where the Member States most readily agree on the need for the EU to achieve 'strategic autonomy'.
• More generally, resilience consists in improving our ability to protect ourselves from destabilisation attempts and attacks below the level of a conflict . Here, the goal is to preserve access to contested strategic spaces , not just cyberspace but also space, the high seas and airspace , all considered shared assets. States could find themselves exposed to denial of access attacks or hybrid threats. In the face of these challenges, we must continue to master the technological skills required to access these spaces (where the defence apparatus could be mobilised), ensure access by promoting international norms and various forms of presence, and be influencers for models and practices.
- For cyber threats, new thresholds of conflict have been crossed with the latest attacks the United States suffered at the hands of Russia and China. Here, the objective is to improve the EU's and Member States' ability to prevent, discourage, and dissuade cyberattacks and be able to respond and speed up the return to normal. More intense coordination and cooperation in the field, now under way (see below), is necessary.
- Space is a fast-evolving field of confrontation, albeit relatively unknown to the wider public, where several countries such as China, India and Russia have anti-satellite capabilities. Russia has already gone on the offensive by manoeuvring an object (Luch-Olymp). But, as the stakes of space become increasingly strategic, the costs become out of reach at the national level. Therefore, we must seek to have the national 'bricks' interact better with European policy. In the United States, the rise of New Space relies on players with considerable resources (ULA--United Launch Alliance--SpaceX, Amazon) with contributions from government orders. Europe could also seek to make its space industry globally competitive while giving it a strategic dimension in terms of security and defence. In so doing, the European Union will have to step up its situational surveillance in space and geosatellite intelligence to the benefit of its own expertise capability--particularly through SatCen (see above)--and that of Member States while looking for capability synergies with defence.
- In the maritime domain, where China is conducting a particularly assertive, even threatening policy, our presence could expand both through the CSDP or through the concept of coordinated maritime presence (see above), the initial feedback of which is encouraging. In particular, the EU must guarantee freedom of navigation and the security of maritime lines of communication and offshore infrastructure. A stronger implementation of Europe's maritime security strategy, initiated in 2014, and an action plan are necessary. It is important to improve maritime capabilities and surveillance while organising regular naval exercises.
• Resilience also consists more generally in reducing our industrial dependence in terms of security and defence and strengthening our access to critical technologies and strategic materials. Finally, strictly in the field of civilian security, it consists in reducing our dependencies to guarantee our economic, health and climate security .
The commission now appears very active on all issues related to resilience, whether they have military implications or not (see below).
• Seen from a different angle, the fundamental issue of response time towards threats could be considered as a part of resilience. Here, the Commission is likely to rely on Article 222 TFEU (see above), but not on Article 42.7 TEU (see above), which strictly concerns the CSDP.
2. Supporting a more 'geopolitical' Commission
The EU's foreign policy has long been largely rhetorical; its power typically manifests as sanctions that are more or less approved by the transatlantic community and, above all, symbolic. It is time for this policy to begin to rely on what makes up the EU's strength: the depth and breadth of its market, its economic and financial power, and its development policy.
• Succeeding Jean-Claude Juncker in 2019 at the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, taking note of the damage to the environment and the international order caused by the Trump administration--even if the situation had already deteriorated under Obama-- expressed the desire for a 'geopolitical commission' .
Beyond certain controversies in terms of method or effectiveness, the negotiations with the pharmaceutical laboratories, the European recovery plan, the actions towards Russia and China and the launch of the Strategic Compass are evidence of a change in dimension.
• Of course, the European project was not overall designed to act geostrategically, but to carry a project of peace and prosperity that relies on free trade. The Commission is organised in silos, with different Directorates-General each setting their own objectives.
With this limit in mind, the establishment in 2020 of the DG DEFIS (for Defence Industries and Space), a new directorate general headed by Thierry Breton that includes defence, the internal market and space , reveals a change in mindset: it shows that the EU will no longer shy away from using its economic power to defend its strategic interests. A simple illustration: in June 2021, an intervention by the European commissioner implied that vaccines could be sent to Belarus in exchange for a return of cooperative relations.
In particular, DG DEFIS is in charge of implementing and controlling the EDF, giving the Commission a foothold in the capability domain through a prism of industrial cooperation.
• The Commission is involved in reflections on the Compass. Its schedule also includes many chapters that will undoubtedly contribute :
- In December 2020, the European Commission and the EEAS presented a new EU cybersecurity strategy , adopted by the Council on 22 March 2021. This strategy's objective is to increase Europe's resilience to cyberthreats and to make sure that all citizens and businesses can fully benefit from reliable digital services and tools. The new strategy includes concrete proposals for the deployment of tools for regulations, investment and action.
In its conclusions, the Council stressed the benefits for years to come of establishing a network of security operations centres throughout the EU in order to monitor and anticipate signs of attack on the network and a joint cybersecurity unit to help define guidelines as to the European crisis management framework on cybersecurity. 5G is highlighted, as is the need for a joint effort to speed up the adoption of security standards that are determinant for an open international Internet and our competitivity in the matter. Similarly, it supports the development of strong encryption and strengthening the cyber-diplomatic toolbox with the need to prevent and counter cyberattacks that have systemic effects likely to affect supply chains, critical infrastructure, essential services or the democratic process or institutions, and compromise economic security . Finally, the proposal to draw up a programme to reinforce the EU's external cyber-capabilities is supported , to increase cyber-resilience and cyber-capabilities throughout the world.
- On 19 January 2021, the Commission issued a Communication on 'The European economic and financial system: fostering openness, strength and resilience' that discussed how to counter the effects of extra-territorial sanctions.
- In terms of capability, it presented an 'action plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries ' on 22 February 2021 that seeks to reinforce Europe's technological lead and support its industrial base.
THE ACTION PLAN ON SYNERGIES BETWEEN CIVIL, DEFENCE AND SPACE INDUSTRIES
Underscoring the link between the civil, defence and space sectors, this plan works to make it easier for businesses, especially SMBs, to identify European funds (EDF, space programme, digital programme, Internal Security Fund, etc.) for which they are eligible and make versatile projects a concrete reality. The objective is to guide innovation towards versatility from conception. The Commission also proposes to establish an ' Observatory of Critical Technologies ' tasked with identifying those that appear strategically important every two years.
The Commission discussed three flagship projects. First, automating drone traffic to make EU industry more competitive in this critical technology domain. It then proposes that the Union take the lead in imposing its space traffic management standards to avoid the collisions that result from satellite proliferation. Finally, the Commission supports establishing an EU space communication system to offer resilient, highly secure high-speed Internet connectivity through quantum encryption. After the Galileo constellation for navigation and the Copernicus Earth observation network, Thierry Breton supports launching a new constellation of European satellites that combines geostationary satellites (GEO) and a low-orbit satellite constellation (LEO).
The Commission is being very proactive here, but to build a strategic culture, it will need to work with a few Member States that have a rather firm stance on the non-militarisation of space.
- On 9 March 2021, the Commission presented a Communication entitled ' 2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade '.
Based on the strategy entitled 'Shaping Europe's digital future' published a year earlier and which remains the general framework for objectives in the matter, this Compass targets four priority domains: digital skills, with the goal of ensuring basic skills for 80% of Europe's population and training 20 million IT specialists; digital infrastructure , the safety and durability of which must ensure that Europe's space is connected and secure, while encouraging European production of digital equipment; businesses' digital transformation to ensure that companies have digital access and promote European innovation; the digitalisation of public services with ambitious objectives for key public services, online health and digital identity.
- Furthermore, the European Council has asked the Commission to draw up a roadmap for the autumn to identify critical infrastructure and strategic sectors where the EU must reduce its dependence.
In general, through its fields of competence, the Commission plays a primordial role in the many domains that are likely to be categorised under 'resilience'. It is active on most fronts that we can imagine, and it must take care not to neglect disarmament through standards, as shown by the working time directive. 66 ( * )
3. 'Partnerships' that should be nurtured with care
The EU intends to consolidate its stature as a geostrategic player by building new partnerships. However, it must adopt a pragmatic approach that does not consider bilateral partnerships as an objective in themselves by forcefully entering into a dialogue with this or that country, organisation or area of the world. It must be guided solely by a good understanding of its interests.
Among these partnerships, the one with NATO is anything but ordinary; in fact it probably provides more structure to the CSDP than the latter does for it.
a) NATO: the central question of 'Who does what?' with the EU
Before anything else, it is important to clarify how the EU and NATO interact outside the military command organisation and the 74 measures to reinforce their cooperation that have been taken in recent times.
Who does what?
• Under the terms of Article 5 of the Washington treaty, NATO ensures the collective defence of its members and, therefore, most of the EU's territory. This is the mutual defence clause , also called the 'Musketeer clause'. Furthermore, it declares itself competent outside its members' territory for crisis management , which is not one of its original missions, but which was fully integrated into its Strategic Concept in 1999.
For its part, to reach a CSDP that is consistent with its 'level of ambition' (see above), the European Union must maintain the autonomy to be able to take action to manage crises in its own neighbourhood. This means that it must be able to do without NATO and not require:
- the consent of all 67 ( * ) the EU's external Allies : especially the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Turkey. In particular, Turkey opposes certain operations on Europe's borders--for example, in Libya--whilst its actions (hostile actions towards Greece and Cyprus, violations of the arms embargo in Libya, etc.) hardly elicit a coordinated reaction from the Allies, since it is one.
- assistance from non-EU Allies , in particular the United States , which has incomparable military potential, but which may not wish--particularly for domestic policy reasons--to intervene in theatres which are far away and where the geopolitical stakes are more indirect.
• However, the CSDP's response appears insufficient given the threats at the top of the spectrum despite the level of ambition set out at Helsinki due to capability issues as well as the number of troops that can be deployed quickly. But there is reason to be reassured : in the current international order, the only theatres where we could conceive of a crisis management operation that requires the top of the spectrum are the Donbass, the Baltic States or Georgia, where we cannot imagine the United States not wanting to intervene because Russia would be the cause.
With this in mind, the roles should be distributed as follows:
- NATO defends Europe's territory and manages crises at the top of the spectrum , both involving the eastern border ,
- the European Union , 68 ( * ) alone or within another framework such as the UN, responds to other security challenges around Europe --stabilisation and peacekeeping operations, controlling migrant movements--which mainly involves crises on the southern border .
THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL: AN OUTDATED DEBATE
We could ask ourselves what would happen if NATO and the EU both wanted to intervene in a theatre external to the EU. This question was debated in the early 2000's (at the same time as Berlin Plus). At the time, the right of first refusal was developed, according to which the Europeans could only act if the United States did not want to act within NATO. In reality, this debate seems largely theoretical because things can only ever happen as if this right existed: when the United States wants to act, it does so, and European countries then act within the NATO framework. The real question, then, is whether the Europeans feel it is necessary to be able to take action when the Americans do not want to.
• But the Member States do not seem to have collectively grasped the consequences of the division of labour that results from the CSDP's level of ambition, even when mitigated by leaving the top of the spectrum to NATO , consequently making interventions increasingly rare (see above).
As a result, there is only a diminished version of the division of labour that arises from Article 5 and the CSDP, which, according to some of observers, is reminiscent of a kind of 'American protectorate' . This situation is not satisfactory for the United States, as the EU's lack of military power hinders its pivot to Asia. It is even less satisfactory for the EU, whose refusal to commit without the Americans is becoming strategically dangerous. Everyone sees it for the military dwarf that it is, and this limits its political reach and weakens its trade positions toward the rest of the world 69 ( * ) , which is its whole reason for being. So, the EU is faced with an existential question: can it remain a trading power without being able to ensure its own security? Evidently, the answer is no . 70 ( * )
Thus, it is worthwhile to review the complementarity between the EU and NATO, to reaffirm and clarify it on the basis of both structures' comparative advantages depending on the regions of the world or the intensity of intervention and consistent with the level of ambition that the EU wants to set for itself . If the Strategic Compass achieved only this, it would still be significant progress given the differences in how this complementarity is conceived. The point is not to draw up a rigid and detailed distribution of roles that may prove counterproductive. Depending on the circumstances and political configurations, an important place must be left for initiative, while it must be left to the States to articulate their actions. But it would be useful to clearly state what the EU must be able do. This would be the basis for an effective reinforcement of the CSDP and greater credibility for the Union .
THE SECURITY BELT AROUND EUROPE: A NEW OBJECTIVE FOR THE CSDP?
This concept, which appears in the scoping paper, is new. It notes that the EU is a continent surrounded by crises: the eastern partnership with Nagorno-Karabakh, the Southern border with an active Eastern Mediterranean and a risk of collapse in the Sahel, etc. This vision is accurate, but it must not limit where we can take action: certain European defence issues are more remote, others closer by.
More remote: without necessarily going as far as the Indo-Pacific, the security of our maritime supplies implies working on our freedom of movement in the Suez Canal--we can all remember the container ship affair--the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Guinea.
Closer by: on European soil itself, because NATO, which is competent for its defence, does not tackle all the threats--at least not yet (see below)--in particular terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber threats, misinformation, foreign interference, etc.
Here, the pitfall would be to go back to the recurring 'NATO and the transatlantic relationship versus European defence and strategic autonomy' debate and the stances that were held before the Trump administration took power. As we know, countries with more limited means and contributions, particularly in the east, give absolute priority to NATO, considering that the CSDP should be limited to responding to the needs of the Atlantic alliance. But a majority of Member States still feel that strengthening the CSDP is how the EU will become a stronger partner within the Alliance .
The United States itself welcomes the efforts of certain European Allies against terrorism in the Sahel, which, in most of their think tanks, is seen as the best laboratory for what an 'open' European strategic autonomy allows: a European security operation that strengthens Euro-Atlantic security overall. In general, Joe Biden has no objection to a stronger CSDP and is not opposed--at least, not openly--to "European strategic autonomy". It does, however, elicit frank scepticism from NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who never fails to remind EU Allies that they only cover 20% of the Alliance's defence spending.
Of course, a greater recognition of what the CSDP brings to NATO would be made easier if EU countries increased their contribution, which requires efforts on capability (see above). But the NATO Secretary General's reservations also seem motivated by the high level of ambition that he has for the Alliance (see below).
• Here, we should note that the establishment of an autonomous European defence--which, remember, is not at all on the agenda--would probably involve a review of Article 42.2 TEU, which states that the CSDP ' shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework '. There is a gradient of theoretical conceptions of role sharing between the EU and NATO, the edges of which are not always very clear.
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO ROLE SHARING BETWEEN THE EU AND NATO
1) The strict division of labour between NATO and the EU as it logically results from the CSDP (see above)
Here, the markers are the territory (the CSDP is interested in Europe's neighbourhood while NATO defends Europe's own territory), the type of conflict (peacekeeping for the CSDP, the top of the spectrum up to nuclear arms for NATO), and American help (yes for NATO, no for the EU). This approach no doubt matches the United States' deepest desire, the Clinton administration having reluctantly accepted intervening in Yugoslavia and the Obama administration having felt that the Libyan, Syrian and Malian crises were not within NATO's remit. In this perspective, the US has long been in favour of the EU's strategic autonomy.
2) Certain approaches imagine a more flexible version of this division of labour. NATO would be the 'leader' in collective defence, and the EU in crisis management with the CSDP, each organisation supporting the other in their field of competence.
3) The 'pillars' : the Atlantic Alliance would stand on an American pillar and 'the European pillar of NATO'. The EU should then be capable of taking on part of the collective defence of Europe. The British, as privileged partners of the United States, are very much opposed to this, because then it would be unimaginable for the currently British D-SACEUR to come from anywhere other than an EU Member State (see above). Whatever the case, if such a defensive pillar were to arise, the United States would have to establish a calendar for removing their troops stationed within the EU, 71 ( * ) at the end of which 'everyone would stay on their side' while maintaining the guarantee of Article 5. The United States would then have more freedom to deploy their forces in accordance with their 'pivot to Asia'.
One should note that the expression 'NATO's European pillar' is used in other ways, included the rather usual referral to the EU's contribution to NATO, without especially looking to qualify it.
The relationship with NATO should also be seen through the prism of military command .
The 'Berlin Plus' agreements were adopted on 17 March 2003 72 ( * ) and laid the foundations for military and political cooperation between the two organisations on the basis of a 'Strategic partnership for crisis management'. Two new structures were created, discussed above:
- A ' permanent cell for planning and conducting EU civilian and military operations without recourse to NATO resources ' placed within the EUMS. This cell is autonomous and separate from NATO structures,
- An EU cell created within NATO military staff (SHAPE) to improve the preparation of EU operations conducted with NATO resources.
Finally, it must be seen through the angle of its partnerships .
During the Warsaw summit in July 2016, both organisations identified certain domains in which they wanted stronger cooperation given the shared challenges the faced in the east and south: fighting hybrid threats, reinforcing defence capabilities, cyber-defence and maritime security, etc.
In December 2016, NATO foreign ministers approved a package of 42 measures to advance cooperation between NATO and the EU. This was supplemented in December 2017 by a new package of 32 measures covering cyber-defence , among other subjects. During the Brussels summit in July 2018, a new joint declaration presented the EU's and NATO's vision in terms of acting against shared threats and highlighting the progress made in cooperation to the benefit of transatlantic security.
NATO and the EU now exchange real-time alerts on cyberattacks, participate in each other's exercises and collaborate in their response to migration crises . The 2018 declaration strengthened their cooperation in many areas, including military mobility, counterterrorism, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear resilience, and promoted an agenda of 'women, peace and security'.
Arrangements of transparency and coordination between NATO and the EU in intelligence seem well-oiled, if a bit bureaucratic. Another important domain for EU-NATO cooperation is military mobility , a major operational issue for the two organisations, since the ability to transport troops and equipment over Europe's territory is essential, particularly in the event of escalating hostilities on the eastern border. The US, Canada and Norway will participate in the "military mobility" PESCO project (on the EU side, an action plan was adopted by the Commission in March 2018, and the multi-annual financial framework (2021-2027) has provided for a dedicated budget).
b) The United States
The quality of the relationship with the United States seems to have been largely restored since the election of Joe Biden , who has gone back on a number of the causes of disagreement with the EU--in matters of security and defence (reduced subsidies, withdrawal from the Vienna Agreement), trade (customs duties and sanctions, fewer concerns about EU taxes on major tech companies) and climate (withdrawal from the Paris agreement)-- culminating in the US-EU summit on 15 June 2021, the day after the NATO summit in Brussels.
In late 2020, the Council called for a structured dialogue with the United States in matters of security and defence, highlighting that a solid reciprocal and long-term partnership should be central to a renewed global alliance between the EU and the United States.
The partnership between the EU and the United States is based on shared values : democracy, liberalism, and respect for the rule of law and human rights. Today, one shared objective is to revitalise the multilateral system and to help restore a rules-based international order .
Beyond the fact that the transatlantic partnership remains the cornerstone of our collective defence, we can identify many fields of cooperation and understanding in terms of the CFSP : the United States' participation in PESCO, the approach to Russia, collaboration in the Western Balkans, joint work for de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, etc.
However, certain, less-promising constants mean that the Europeans will have to be wary of following anything that is not in their interest : the pivot to Asia and the United States' desire to impose their approach to China , which tends to favour integrating capability within NATO to the benefit of their military-industrial apparatus (and thus to the detriment of the EDTIB), entering into a pattern of strong economic competition with the EU, using extra-territorial sanctions, etc. Furthermore, problems related to ITAR (see above) could arise within the EDA's cooperation with the United States. In the coming years, new instruments could increase the EU's autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, such as a carbon tax at the border that may affect certain American companies, and regulations of the community's digital space that apply to American tech giants and require them to respect European's data protection laws.
No doubt the European Union will need to make a particular effort to remember that an authentic partnership requires each party to take its own interests into account.
c) United Kingdom
Whatever Europe's aspirations are towards establishing a privileged post-Brexit relationship with the United Kingdom, we must be realistic about the appetite for European security and defence mechanisms for a country that is so anchored in the transatlantic relationship . There is no reason for its relative disinterest and scepticism in the matter to ebb away with Brexit. In fact, the British left Althea even though the Berlin Plus format did not require them to, they will not take part in the coordinated maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific, and they show no interest in PESCO. They drew up their last strategic review with NATO and the United States in mind, 73 ( * ) seeking to have the Alliance cover resilience problems (which the EU is resolved to cover more of, particularly under the impetus of the Strategic Compass) while ensuring the D-SACEUR remains British (see above), which Brexit should have called into question. 74 ( * )
Of course, the United Kingdom still has a full interest in Europe's security. But it goes through NATO, the CJEF (Combined Joint Expeditionary Force), 75 ( * ) the EII (initiated in 2018 and inspired by the CJEF to a certain degree), the JEF (see above) and bilateral relationships, especially the one with France in the Lancaster House agreements (which initiated the CJEF) since 2010. Finally, the United Kingdom remains engaged in the eFP (see above) and in maritime surveillance missions.
It seems that the contact maintained via the EII, of which the United Kingdom is a founding member, is the surest launchpad for improving the Euro-British defence and security relationship.
d) The Indo-Pacific
The European Union is as interested in the Indo-Pacific as much as it fears actions from China to deny access to a very strategically and economically sensitive area.
This region is home to 60% of the world's population and the fastest-growing GDPs on the planet ; 30% of the world's sea commerce goes through the Strait of Malacca towards the Suez Canal, which makes it a vital area for European supplies. More than a third of French exports outside the European Union go to the Indo-Pacific region. This area, which has several nuclear countries, has also seen the biggest efforts in defence investment over the last ten years.
The lack of regulations and multilateral consensus on the conditions for accessing and using shared spaces makes it easier for conflicts to arise between countries or against non-state actors throughout the region.
The EU can work to strengthen its position in the region by supporting the conclusion of a strategic partnership with ASEAN, by joining the East Asia Summit (EAS), and by resuming negotiations on free trade agreements--particularly with certain ASEAN countries--with a view to an ambitious bi-regional agreement, a revitalisation of the Europe-Asia dialogue known as "ASEM" (Asia Europe Meeting), which is destined to become a forum for the expression of Europe's ambitions in Asia, the implementation of Europe's strategy for connectivity between the EU and Asia and, above all, the determination of a European strategy in the Pacific, which is shaping up to be a major challenge for the FPEU .
Indeed, the EU still has only the beginnings of cooperation in the region. But its vision of the Indo-Pacific is beginning to coalesce due to the numerous exchanges with Indo-Pacific partners--summits with India, Japan, South Korea--who expect the EU to reciprocate.
Pressing the issue, especially coming from France, does elicit certain questions in terms of security and defence. It is the only Member State, alongside the Netherlands and Germany, to have maritime availability in the Indo-Pacific, keeping in mind that each of these two countries deploy just a single frigate, and even then, only for part of the year. Evidently, there is a risk that such a broad security and defence issue could be more appropriately dealt with in the NATO framework, together with the great maritime powers of the United States and the United Kingdom , which could compromise the EU's autonomy in dealing with China.
e) Other partnerships
The relationship between the EU and the UN is generally described as operating satisfactorily, in the limits of the two structures' respective objectives. In particular, the limits placed by the United Nations are systematically integrated in the CSDP's operations.
However, the OSCE 76 ( * ) merits more attention, especially with a view to a peaceful resolution of frozen conflicts in certain countries of the Eastern Partnership 77 ( * ) --in the Donbass in Eastern Ukraine, in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Georgia and in Moldova. Poland, Romania and the Baltic States consider that the EPF (see above) should help to reinforce this partnership , which could stoke tensions with Russia. The Europeans should also strengthen their cross-border links with the populations of these countries, especially in health care and education.
Africa , which could become a driver for global growth but whose political and security situations have evolved in a way that is potentially destabilising for the EU, must have its full attention. It is now in competition with China and Russia in many domains. Fortunately, Africa is becoming a priority on the European agenda: the prospect of a renewed partnership with the countries in the southern Mediterranean is becoming clearer, the February 2020 joint communication 'Towards a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa' tends to strengthen ties, a "post-Cotonou" 78 ( * ) agreement between the EU and the OECPS 79 ( * ) was signed on 15 April 2021, a sixth African Union-EU summit before 2022 should set shared priorities for a common future, etc. In this "Pivot to Africa", the EU can already be proud of its intentions, and priority will be given to consolidating institutions, creating civil infrastructure, education and fighting poverty, which has been exacerbated by the health crisis and which of course determines growth, security, an effective fight against terrorism and keeps emigration under control.
4. What relationship with China?
China poses a growing threat to the EU , as seen in the economic and information fields. Problems with China essentially revolve around issues of resilience : digital sovereignty, misinformation, industrial capacity, competitiveness, market access, risk of denial of access to sea lanes, especially in the straits.
In the EU's geostrategic environment, China is probably the subject that has seen the greatest change in approach over the past two years. Once discreet, it has recently become very present, even aggressive. At least the ad hominem insults of a Chinese ambassador in France against a French researcher and the package of Chinese sanctions against European academics and parliamentarians in retaliation for the European sanctions taken for the repression of the Uyghur minority have had the merit of clarifying the situation. The EU sees its relationship with China as a 'partner, competitor, rival' and can be summarised as a ' systemic rival '.
The 17+1 format, which brings together China and 17 central and eastern European countries along the new silk roads, was momentarily seen as a serious risk to the European Union's cohesion. But the enthusiasm of the 17 has since seriously receded. There is now a widely held feeling within the EU that everyone needs to 'play as a team' regarding China, which is trying to manage its relations with the 27 Member States separately. The ideal would be to go from a 17+1 format to 27+1.
In any case, China must be able to remain a partner on climate issues and be considered by the European Union as a simple competitor, for example on trade issues, whereas the United States slips more easily into a hostile or rival stance. The pitfall here would be handling the China issue solely through NATO , which would automatically result in United States interference in European trade policy.
Thus, the EU must clarify its own strategic position towards China. In economics, this means demanding reciprocity . In so doing, China could well replace Trump's America as the main driver behind the EU's 'geopoliticisation'. The EU has already adopted a new framework of sanctions for human rights breaches and stricter rules for exporting dual-purpose goods (civil and military), rules which now apply to cybersurveillance technologies produced by the EU.
* 65 The aim is to 'stay in the race' for the development of industrial cloud computing that the Internet of Things requires.
* 66 The Slovenian Supreme Court referred an interlocutory question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that is being decided, asking it to rule on whether Directive 2003/88/EC concerning 'certain aspects of the organisation of working time' applies to troops. France has consistently argued that the application of the directive would be incompatible with the principle of availability, which means 'serving at any time and in any place' as defined in the General Statute of the Military and would trivialise soldiers' profession. In the same category, we should mention the issue of semi-autonomous lethal arms (SALA) or explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), where establishing standards could have direct consequences on capability.
* 67 Decisions to intervene must be unanimous, both in NATO and the CSDP. Here is a list of NATO member countries that are not EU members: Albania, Canada, Iceland, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States; NATO countries members of the EU: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain; the non-NATO EU countries: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden.
* 68 Or European countries in other intergovernmental defence frameworks.
* 69 Positions which are also subject to the whims of America's extraterritorial sanctions, as shown by the trading relationship with Iran or, for a time, the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.
* 70 This was illustrated in July 2020 with Boris Johnson's rejection of Huawei's 5G after Donald Trump threatened to burn certain bridges, particularly in intelligence.
* 71 Here, we should clarify that American troops stationed in Europe are essentially intended for American operations in the Middle East. Faced with a Russian takeover of European territory, such as in the Netherlands or in the Suwalki region, NATO's defence of Europe would not be immediate given the reality of the resources that can be mobilised on site.
* 72 Agreements for which, in 2002, the Prague Summit, followed by the joint declaration on the European security and defence policy, opened the way.
* 73 The exercise provides for a spectacular increase in the number of nuclear warheads.
* 74 Since the United Kingdom has left the EU, it would be logical for the D-SACEUR to come from one of its Member States, given that they are commander of EU operations within Berlin Plus, which counts among its prerogatives the 'strategic coordinator' with the European Union, and that Member States' military weight in NATO is greater than that of the United Kingdom.
* 75 The result of a Franco-British ambition expressed in the Lancaster House agreements, this is a bi-national force of up to 10,000 troops that can be mobilised at very short notice and is capable of carrying out high-intensity operations across the whole spectrum of threats. However, it is likely that the UK would prefer or be unable to use it in an operation that did not include the United States, not least because of their dependence on intelligence (via the Five Eyes, the intelligence alliance of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States), which would deprive them of the possibility of independent action. The CJEF was declared fully operational in November 2020.
* 76 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
* 77 An EU neighbourhood policy that seeks to conclude agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, initiated in Prague on 7 May 2009.
* 78 It succeeds the Cotonou agreement signed in 2000, which itself succeeded the Lomé agreements of 1975.
* 79 Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, which replaced the ACP Group of States in April 2020.