B. ... TO JUMPSTART THE CSDP21 ( * ) ...
To achieve a more effective EU security and defence policy, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS, see above) was supplemented by an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD), which arose from the conclusions of the Council of the European Union on 14 November 2016. It established the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), relaunched the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), established the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and reinforced the EU's rapid reaction capability, which includes the European Union Battlegroups (EU BGs). The Council also adopted the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP), which includes the establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF), and a plan to implement the EU-NATO Warsaw Declaration of 8 July 2016. These instruments were largely preceded by the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and have since been joined by the European Peace Facility (EPF).
Despite this proliferation of 'acronym' initiatives, the relaunch of the CFSP/CSDP by the Lisbon Treaty and then the EUGS has been disappointing. Cooperation on capabilities does not lead to sufficiently effective coordination to truly increase the EU's autonomy, while the CSDP is proving to be less and less active on the ground, in contrast to the intensity and frequency of crises on the EU's doorstep.
The assessment suggests untangling the web of existing instruments, which implies initially separating the CSDP's capability and operational aspects.
1. The capability aspect
Here, the aim is to allow the European Union to overcome its capability shortfalls while acquiring a "European Defence Technological and Industrial Base" (EDTIB) , which will create jobs and, above all, be essential to its autonomy in security and defence. It is worth remembering that, in the Strategic Compass, capabilities constitute the third 'basket', whose size is determined by the first two, which address crisis management and resilience objectives, respectively.
a) Overcoming inertia
The many instruments available, which are clearly not well coordinated, have produced disappointing results, with a European security and defence capability that is much lower than the level of military spending would suggest.
The fault lies in a lack of common will : Member States are ontologically driven to act autonomously in the military field, which has a strong sovereign aspect. They tend to allocate their capability investments according to their own strategic interests and their desire to maintain control in line with their idea of their own power and rank.
So, we should not be surprised that the CSDP's capability achievements are still meagre compared with those that result from national initiatives or partnership projects outside the CSDP , for example those that have united France and the United Kingdom for more than 10 years under the Lancaster House agreements, in particular the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), or those that unite it with Germany with major capability projects such as the FCAS (future combat air system) and the MGCS (Main Ground Combat System), the "tank of the future". 22 ( * ) Similarly, NATO elicits a significantly better coordinated capability response than that of the CSDP (see below).
Will the Strategic Compass, by building a measure of consensus on the threats, encourage some commonality of views on the capabilities deemed necessary and, therefore, greater political involvement by Member States in mobilising capability instruments, particularly with a view to establishing an EDTIB?
Of course, this renewed impetus should result in maintaining the NATO and European objective (see below) of defence spending of 2% of GDP ; slowing down this effort risks causing a strategic decline that may be difficult to overcome. The Europeans have already started to increase their defence budgets and have just returned to 2008 spending levels. However, while French defence spending represented 2.1% of GDP in 2020, other EU countries, despite significant progress, remain far from the 2% objective, in particular Germany, Italy and Spain, with 1.6%, 1.4% and 1.2% of their respective GDPs in 2020. However, the upward trend in expenditure (see the graph in the introduction) could slow down (see below).
But first of all, this resolve must result in a significant increase in cooperation and coordination in capabilities. Improvement in this area would allow for a very significant optimisation of military spending at the EU level.
b) Instruments to be mobilised...
For many of the instruments established, there is an obvious discrepancy between their potential and how they are actually used.
(1) The European Defence Agency (EDA)
When discussing the CSDP bodies, priority was probably given to the European Defence Agency (EDA), which was created in 2004. It helps its 26 Member States (all EU countries except Denmark, which has a CSDP opt-out 23 ( * ) ) to develop their military resources by promoting collaboration, launching initiatives and making proposals to improve the EU's defence capabilities. It works to strengthen the European defence industry by acting as a catalyst and facilitator for defence ministries willing to work on collaborative defence capability projects.
In particular, it draws up the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and presents the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) (see below).
Care should be taken to ensure that new initiatives--in particular PESCO--do not marginalise this body with its proven expertise and valuable experience in studying and initiating capability projects.
(2) The Capability Development Plan (CDP)
• The Capability Development Plan (CDP), which has been drawn up periodically by the EDA since 2006, sets the EU's defence capability priorities in the short, medium and long term. It has been strengthened to reflect EUGS's level of ambition (CDP of 28 June 2018).
This plan is established in part on the ' Progress catalogue ', a catalogue of the capability shortfalls, drawn up by the European Union Military Staff ( EUMS ) based on the Headline Goal Process ( HLGP ). The HLGP is a process to identify capability shortfalls, defined in 1999 and based on five war game-style 'illustrative scenarios' . This process can be compared to the NDPP, the NATO Defence Planning Process (see below).
In the first phase of the HLGP, the EUMS identifies all the military resources needed for these scenarios to be a success in a 'Requirement Catalogue'. The needs are then compared to the inventory of forces that the countries report being able to make available to the EU in a 'Force Catalogue'. Finally, a 'Progress Catalogue' is drawn up, inventorying the capability shortfalls.
• There is a bias that exists when drawing up the Force Catalogue, since certain countries consider that materials made available for NATO are not available for the CSDP. Only a small share of Member States' capabilities is reported as available to the CSDP, whereas they report around half for NATO as Allies. 24 ( * ) The idea that increasing EU forces also helps to strengthen NATO in a spirit of non-duplication should guide Europe's practices, in accordance with the 'single set of forces' model. Sincere reporting is no doubt an essential area of improvement that would make the EU's whole capability process more reliable whilst authentically demonstrating adherence to the CSDP project.
• Additionally, the HLGP seems questionable in that it makes a somewhat simplistic association between the intensity of a crisis and the volume of forces required. Thus, for a very low-intensity crisis, very few soldiers would be deployed. Conversely, the fifth scenario , intended to respond to a very high-intensity crisis, relies on the deployment of 60,000 soldiers . However, this extreme scenario, directly derived from the Helsinki objective (see below), and no longer likely outside the NATO framework 25 ( * ) , is already half considered obsolete. Remember, the heaviest operation that the EU has taken on to date, which succeeded NATO in Bosnia, comprised 10,000 troops. However, this scenario is systematically studied, resulting in capability targets that are both useless and unreachable.
In France, the Armed Forces Ministry supports adding a more realistic sixth scenario , similar to Operation Serval, of a deployment of around 5,000 troops--which would be equal to two large Battlegroups (see below)--for a combat mission in a hard-to-reach environment, requiring a first entry capability under air cover.
This scenario would break with the correlation between the number of troops deployed and the intensity of the operation in favour of a realistic assessment of the interventions under consideration, which are proportionally more demanding of material resources and training than in the number of soldiers . It would lend credibility to the capability process and reveal much more immediate needs, and satisfying them would be more in line with the level of commitment that Europe is ready to make and give it a chance to clarify its 'level of ambition' (see below). In particular, such a scenario would reveal our shortcomings concerning 'critical enablers', capabilities such as air-to-air refuelling, strategic transport, UAVs and satellites, for which we remain highly dependent, particularly on the United States.
(3) The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)
• Presented by the EDA, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) provides a complete overview of Member States' defence spending and investments , including research . It allows us to see their defence planning and the development of their capabilities while listing the gaps with regards to the CDP .
The aim of this inventory of the European defence landscape is to facilitate cooperation on capability by identifying avenues for collaboration in order to achieve the objectives defined by the CDP. Thus, the CARD seeks to align Member States' defence planning in a European perspective.
In November 2020 , Europe's defence ministers approved the first CARD . This report argues that ' continuous efforts will be needed over a long period in defence spending, planning and cooperation to overcome costly fragmentation and benefit from synergies and enhanced military interoperability '.
The report identifies 55 possibilities for multinational cooperation in all military domains, including 17 in land operations, 14 in air operations, and 12 in maritime operations.
CARD identifies six 'next generation capabilities as focus areas' for Member States to concentrate their efforts:
- Main Battle Tank, for which 11 countries have expressed an interest in cooperation,
- European Patrol Class Surface Ship (7 countries),
- Soldier systems (10 countries),
- Counter UAS/Anti Access/Area Denial,
- Defence in Space,
- Enhanced Military Mobility.
The report specifies that the CARD may ' result in new cooperation projects launched by Member States in various formats - under PESCO, within EDA or in other bilateral or multinational frameworks - should they choose to take them forward '. In this regard, it would be a shame for the Strategic Compass, just when it jumpstarted thinking on capabilities, to delay the implementation of the CARD's recommendations on the most obvious shortcomings.
(4) Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
• The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, was not launched until December 2017.
Overview
This is a policy framework which essentially aims to increase defence spending and initiate equipment and operational projects . In line with how capability instruments interoperate, PESCO is the framework for cooperation on projects to increase European defence capabilities .
PESCO was initially seen as an instrument to integrate the military capabilities of a limited number of States who would sign up to ambitious commitments. Ultimately, PESCO was extended to all Member States except Denmark and Malta, in accordance with a very integrative vision promoted by Germany, as opposed to France's vision.
PESCO's commitments
PESCO Member States undertake to respect 20 commitments , in particular:
- increase defence budgets in real terms , with a target of 2% of GDP dedicated to defence, of which 20% is allocated to investments. This adopts the financial commitments made within NATO, 26 ( * )
- make national forces easier to deploy and make progress on their interoperability plan,
- increase the number of multinational capability projects and strengthen the EDTIB .
Each year, each Member State produces a national implementation plan in which they detail the measures taken to fulfil each of these commitments. These documents are evaluated in a report by the High Representative.
A framework for many projects involving many partners
Since PESCO was launched, 47 collaborative projects have been approved: 17 projects on 6 March 2018, 17 others on 9 November 2018, and 13 on 12 November 2019. France is involved in 38 of these projects: it coordinates 10, participates in 21 of them, and is an observer on 7 projects. A fourth wave of projects was initiated in 2021.
The most ambitious project in terms of capability is probably the MALE ( Medium Altitude, Long Endurance ) Eurodrone. Bringing together Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic, it aims to address one of the European Union's major shortcomings, which France encountered in its fight against terrorism in the Sahel, forcing it to buy US Reaper drones. Other examples include ECOWAR (EU Collaborative Warfare Capabilities) for land-air-sea collaborative warfare and TWISTER (Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based Theater Surveillance) for space surveillance.
Previously, cooperation almost always involved the same key Member States : France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. From this point of view, PESCO provides welcome change . For example, it is the first time that France has cooperated with Lithuania, Poland and Finland.
Openness to third States
By virtue of a decision of the Council of the European Union of 5 November 2020, PESCO is now open to third States . The United Kingdom could take part, but they have not shown any interest in PESCO at this stage. However, in March 2021, the United States made an official request to take part in certain PESCO projects, in particular military mobility , alongside Canada and Norway. This participation was accepted by the Foreign Affairs Council (Defence) on 6 May 2021.
• A mixed record
Inconsistent achievements
In May 2020, a report on the European Union's military services regretted that Member States were struggling to meet their commitments, that many were not differentiating their contributions from their contributions to NATO, and that most projects were progressing very slowly, or not at all--with other sources considering that some projects were literally stalled straight out of the gate. This report recommends being more selective , reducing the number of projects in favour of better political support , with the lowest priorities being addressed through bilateral or multilateral initiatives instead.
The 2020 Strategic Review of Permanent Structured Cooperation , approved by the Council on 20 November 2020, includes an assessment of the progress made as well as guidelines for the next phase (2021-2025). It stressed the need for more binding commitments and tangible achievements by 2025 .
An openness to third States that requires vigilance
France is worried about the effects of the US ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations ) regulations that limit the export of technologies by requiring manufacturers of defence equipment that contains one or more American components to obtain US approval to sell the equipment. A shared 'ITARised' project would obviously run counter to the goal of strategic autonomy, which PESCO is intended to promote by increasing Europe's defence capability.
The above-mentioned decision of the Council of the European Union specifies that the participation of a third State must not lead to dependence, restrictions imposed on research and development of capabilities, or the use and export of weapons. 27 ( * ) Member States must commit to staying within this legal framework. But perhaps the way to avoid ITARisation would be to conclude a binding international agreement exempting all projects under this framework from US extraterritorial regulations prior to any administrative arrangement.
Furthermore, Turkey would also like to join the European project on military mobility, which poses a value compatibility problem. More generally, and rightfully so, certain Member States consider that third State participation should remain the exception in order to avoid situations where the mutual benefits could become unbalanced.
Organisational redundancy
Cooperation projects may be launched within the EDA (see above) in such a way that PESCO, whose efforts fall short of the initial ambitions as reflected in the 20 commitments, in a way duplicates the Agency.
(5) The European Defence Fund (EDF)
• The European Defence Fund (EDF), a long-standing French project supported by Germany and the flagship measure of the EDAP (see above), has been operational since 1 January 2021 . It replaces both the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), with €90 million allocated from 2017 to 2019, and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), with €500 million over the 2019-2020 period, which were set up to support PESCO. In fact, 15 of the 26 projects selected in the 2020 EDIDP were PESCO projects.
With the EDF, the Commission wants to support investment in defence research and the development of common technologies and equipment, including PESCO projects , which have been given priority treatment with a 10-point increase in funding. The stakeholders must include at least three companies from three different European countries . The funding rate is increased for projects that include SMBs, which encourages the growth of small defence businesses and the inclusion of smaller EU countries.
Ultimately, the EDF is intended to stimulate cooperation between manufacturers and help create a true EDTIB . In the long run, the goal is also to improve interoperability between Member States' military equipment. All these objectives work to strengthen the European Union's strategic autonomy .
In this perspective, as this is a European resource, companies and subsidiaries of companies from non-EU countries are not eligible for EDF funding , contrary to what the Trump administration had hoped for. Like PESCO, the EDF is a European initiative that the Americans saw as unfriendly if it was not open to all Allies. Even now, they do not look favourably on this restriction.
In the same spirit, the beneficiaries of the Fund and their subcontractors must not be subject to the control of a third country or third-country entities, except in special cases. Furthermore, companies that participate in an EDF-funded programme are required to ' refuse any provision that seeks to limit the use of the desired products, in terms of intellectual property, by foreign legislation '. This provision limits the effects of the American ITAR legislation (see above).
Overall, €8 billion was allocated to the fund for the 2021-2027 period , including €2.7 billion intended for research and €5.3 billion for development initiatives. 5% of funds are allocated to breakthrough technologies and innovative equipment. While this envelope is less than the commission's initial ambitions (€13 billion), dedicating such a share of the European budget to military ends is notable progress .
Beneficiary projects include the European Secure Software Defined Radio (ESSOR) and the European MALE 2020 UAV (see above) led by Airbus in the EDIDP framework. The EDF is now called on to monitor the implementation of these projects.
On 22 February 2021, European Commissioner Thierry Breton, in charge of the internal market, industrial policy, digital technologies, defence and space, presented an action plan for the EU intended to 'increase synergies between civilian, space and defence industries', which relies on the EDF (see below).
*
If correctly funded over time and used in accordance with its purpose, the EDF could benefit all industries, both large corporations and SMBs, promote a lasting convergence of industrial bases, and allow Member States to access structural, next-generation technologies and equipment that meet the capability objectives of EU Member States, not only as such, but also, if necessary, as members of NATO. France intends to play a driving role by supporting greater powers for the new DG DEFIS within the commission on defence issues, while consolidating the respective roles of the EEAS and the EDA.
However, there are two points on which we must remain vigilant. On the one hand, the tripartite governance of the EDF (Member States, Commission, Manufacturers) allows the Commission to introduce complexities that could discourage certain companies. In particular, the EDF works with annual budgets whilst projects are multi-year.
On the other, certain Member States see the EDF as a redistribution fund , which leads back to the overall debate on PESCO's selectivity for its members and projects. A certain divergence in point of view seems to have emerged between the E4 (France, Italy, Spain and Germany), which highlights defence objectives, and the E23 (the other Member States), which stresses the defence industry. Within the E4, Germany stands out, however, by its sharp tendency towards civilian-military integration and a greater readiness to conceive of the military apparatus in the wider field of security than the three other countries, which maintain a heavily operational conception.
c) ...and to better interact, including with the operational aspect
(1) A necessary coordination
• There are several categories of explanations for a capability process that still seems disappointing in its achievements and sub-optimal in its operations .
- First, the process is fragmented and presents certain flaws in logic .
The Capability Development Plan established by the EDA is intended to take into account the 'Progress Catalogue' from the EUMS's HLGP (Headline Goal Process). Remember, this Progress Catalogue identifies, with regard to the CSDP's level of ambition, the missing capabilities that must be obtained quickly on the basis of a "Force Catalogue" that results from capability reports that are known to be sometimes inaccurate (see above).
In any case, one would expect the CDP to explain how to acquire the capabilities identified in the Progress Catalogue in terms of time, costs and cooperation. However, the CDP's ambition is actually broader, since it is also supposed to take into account the needs expressed by the Member States, whether or not they are linked to the CSDP.
Ultimately, the CDP merely lists the priorities that the Member States are willing to set for themselves, 28 ( * ) based on a Progress Catalogue that is not always reliable and with deadlines that are not always reliable either! 29 ( * )
Thus, the CDP only imperfectly reflects the EU's capability needs. Nevertheless, it contributes to the CARD , which allows us to compare the CDP's objectives to Member States' results.
Furthermore, PESCO projects that receive funds from the EDF , which follows an industrial logic set by the Commission with a view to developing an EDTIB, are not directly linked to these mechanisms.
The entire capability process, which follows a 'bottom-up' philosophy, emphasises Member State initiatives. But they condition their approval on building capabilities whose ambitions are indeed affirmed.
However, it would be useful to better articulate the three philosophies at work : the EUMS with the Headline Goal Process which produces the Progress Catalogue, the EDA with the CDP and the CARD, and the Commission, which organises industrial cooperation. Each pursues distinct objectives that are justifiable, but they should now be aligned and made coherent to respond to and serve each other, while taking into account the additional constraint of aligning the EU's capability planning time cycle with NATO's.
- The process is also insufficiently incentivising . In the NATO process, the general capability targets are established in the same manner as the EUMS, then each country is assigned a specific capability target according to its means--for example, buy a refuelling tanker or acquire new combat aircraft. Then, there is a collective review process where countries that have not reached their targets are 'named and shamed'. No such thing exists with the CARD.
- Lastly, it coexists not only with a long-standing, well-established and effective NATO capability process 30 ( * ) (see below), alongside which the European process can be seen as a new obligation of questionable value, but also alongside national capability processes, which obviously take priority . Many countries, including France, do not meet the targets set by both the NATO and European capability processes; Turkey, similarly, ignores NATO capability targets.
In this respect, the scoping paper provides for the inclusion of aspects of the EU capability process in national planning. 31 ( * ) The priority given to the national aspect is explained in part by a poor alignment of national capability processes with the European capability process. The ideal situation would be one that integrates the relevant aspects of the CSDP in the national 'capability kitchens'.
(2) Looking for an overall coherence with the EU's level of ambition
- While European defence spending is nowhere near that of the United States , it remains intrinsically significant. If it were better conducted and coordinated , it could cover our needs satisfactorily .
The USA spends €785 billion on defence (estimate for 2020). This colossal expense is essentially justified by maintaining its global leadership--the United States spends more than all the other States combined--and providing opportunities for an industrial-military complex that is structural to their economy. In reality, just 5% of this spending is dedicated to Europe.
Europe's defence effort must be assessed not in comparison to its Allies' spending, but to that of its potential adversaries. Europe already spends €219 billion on its defence without the United Kingdom (Brexit) and Denmark (opt-out), whereas Russia spends €61 billion, nearly four times less. This is the reality of the relative resources of the 'Russian ogre' which arouses such fear in Eastern and Northern Europe .
Thus, the major problem for Europeans is the fragmentation of their spending. When 27 countries all want to have fighter planes and ocean-going ships and each buys equipment on its own, even 4% of GDP spent on defence would not be enough to create a coherent crisis management tool. Countries such as Russia or Israel have one command, objective and planning unit. In reality, with coordinated spending, the target of 2% of GDP (see above) would probably be enough for the EU to have a real European defence, whereas it is currently struggling to deal with all the crisis management scenarios on its own.
Perhaps, therefore, it would be better to not focus on indefinitely increasing the pressure on financial input , the main effect of which is to provide outlets for a military industry that is still insufficiently located in Europe, but rather to exert real pressure on military output, which forces Europeans to better integrate their capabilities and, if possible, to produce them.
From this standpoint, the Strategic Compass is precious in that it could set a level of ambition that is at once sufficiently high, realistic, and specific.
• Which one? Remember that, unlike the five illustrative scenarios built to model a capability requirement, the sixth scenario put forward by France, that of a European first entry force of 5,000 troops but which is very demanding in terms of equipment, is both realistic and operational. In this same perspective, the non-paper on crisis management coordinated by France proposes to rapidly prepare such a ' first entry force' of 5,000 troops, which could match this level of ambition.
In general, it would be essential for the Compass's success for it to establish a scenario that reflects an ambition that is consistent with a prudent sharing of crisis management roles between NATO and the EU (see below). It would collectively oblige the Member States to draw up a detailed and coherent set of capabilities, in line with the possibilities of human deployment that could be organised simultaneously. This would result in a lower level of ambition--especially compared to Helsinki (see below), which is very demanding but which no one speaks of anymore--in exchange for effectiveness.
2. The operational aspect
• The jumpstart of the CSDP's instruments in recent years has, paradoxically, been accompanied by a net decline in EU missions and operations . The situations in Syria, Mali, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh did not elicit the slightest desire to send a European force. And when a launch is considered, it is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve. Then, there is a clear discrepancy between the political objectives that are decided and the resources allocated during force generation, as demonstrated by Operation Irini, so much so that it reduces missions' and operations' added value. In short, to put it simply, between the time needed to come to a unanimous agreement and the time needed for force generation, the EU may not be capable of launching an operation at the required speed , unlike certain Member States, whether they gather a coalition or not.
In fact, among the 17 ongoing missions and operations, there are now only three executive military operations 32 ( * ) ; the others are split between 'non-executive' military operations and civilian missions from which it is sometimes difficult to disengage, given that a dozen of these missions and operations seem to have more or less achieved as much as they can.
CURRENT CSDP OPERATIONS
17 civilian or military missions are currently deployed (18 others have ended), including:
• 6 military operations, including 3 executive and 3 non-executive operations (training):
- in the Mediterranean (EU NAVFOR MED Irini anti-smuggling mission launched in 2015)
- on the Somali coast (NAVFOR ATALANTA naval operation against piracy launched in 2008)
- in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA peacekeeping mission launched in 2004)
- in Central African Republic (EUTM CAR armed forces training mission launched in 2016)
- in Mali (EUTM Mali military training mission launched in 2013)
- in Somalia (EUTM Somalia military training mission launched in 2010)
• 11 civilian missions for policing and security force or rule of law support, capacity building or border assistance:
- in Europe (EULEX in Kosovo, EUBAM in Moldova and Ukraine, although the latter is not directly led by CSDP, EUAM in Ukraine, EUMM in Georgia)
- in the Middle East (EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah in the Palestinian Territories and EUAM in Iraq)
- in Africa (EUBAM in Libya, EUCAP SAHEL in Mali, EUCAP SAHEL in Niger and EUCAP Somalia)
• A few basic principles can be reiterated based on the texts. Article 42.1 TEU states that the CSDP, ' an integral part of the CFSP ', ' shall provide the Union with an operational capability drawing on civilian and military assets ', which it may use in ' missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. '
As the EU does not have an army, carrying out CSDP missions relies on civilian and military ' capabilities provided by the Member States ' (same article).
Article 42.4 TEU states that ' decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. '
Thus, the decision to initiate an operation is taken in an intergovernmental framework where one State can block all the others. 33 ( * )
The CFSP is headed by the HR/VP, who has authority over the European External Action Service (EEAS) , which in charge of steering the EU's civilian and military crisis management components.
a) A desire that needs a jumpstart
There are many causes behind the CSDP's slowdown. The CSDP's first period, from 2003 to 2008, benefited from the remaining effects of the Balkans humiliation as well as the interest that a new policy elicits. Over time, with the replacement of political leaders, the favourable environment dissipated, leaving a granite bedrock of aversion to lethal risks, a strong affinity to NATO, and a pacifism supported by neutral Member States such as Ireland and Austria. Add to this the lack of a European command capability for executive missions, incomplete intelligence as well as the spectre of very big issues since 2008 (financial crisis, Brexit, etc.), and we can understand the sort of resignation that Member States have towards the CSDP's growing inertia.
Since this framework leaves them free to participate in a mission or not, we must ask ourselves: how can it incentivise a Member State that--like France--has the resources to conduct and coordinate a given operation by itself with volunteer Member States--just as it did with Takuba, for example?
In reality, once the obstacle of unanimity has been overcome, the CSDP has a lot to offer . Financial solidarity , while limited, remains substantial 34 ( * ) , and this should increase for military missions with the European Defence Fund (see below). The Military Planning Capability, which presages a European military command , indirectly relieves national military staffs of non-executive military missions. Finally, the CSDP provides essential political legitimacy . 35 ( * )
Thus, the disconnect between the increase in conflicts and the evolution of CSDP military missions is not normal and is detrimental to the EU's strategic weight on the world stage.
We must take actions to the obstacles to using the CSDP , while keeping in mind the increasing seriousness and variety of the risks, for example in terms of access to contested strategic spaces, which must encourage us to implement new, faster, more flexible possibilities for engagement .
b) Overcoming the principle of unanimity
The unanimity required to initiate an external operation is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain among the 27 Member States, 36 ( * ) especially for military operations , since civilian crisis management is easier to gain approval through the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which brings together the Member States' ambassadors.
As recently as the late 2000s, France and Spain easily gained approval for Operation Atalanta against piracy on the Somali coast, and France was able to initiate EUFOR Chad without much difficulty. In 2013, it was harder to gain acceptance for EUTM Mali, but it was successful thanks to very well-prepared plans. In 2020, Irini was blocked several times by Austria and Hungary, who did not want to participate.
The principled opposition of some Member States to military operations, combined with the increasing number of criteria to be taken into account, is becoming a blocking factor . In fact, debates in the PSC are revealing an increasing number of divisions: one Member State denounces the local armies' violations, another rejects the prospect of lethal equipment, and yet another highlights problems of gender balance - at least 30% women are needed, and there are not enough of them... Certain smaller Member States that traditionally agree to operations while remaining outside them are beginning to take positions of principle for domestic political reasons.
Could we imagine going back on the principle of unanimity? No doubt we could soften the edges with so-called 'constructive abstention' mechanisms, already used for the EPF for providing lethal weapons (see below). But a full reversal of the principle of unanimity in a domain as intrinsically sovereign as security and defence is still far-fetched . Therefore, we should try to accommodate it while remaining capable of initiating a sufficient operation within a useful timeframe. The scoping paper includes an objective to ' enhance flexibility and speed of decision-making '.
(1) The current easy way to take quick action or overcome opposition is ad hoc coordination.
Member States who feel an urgent need to intervene are increasingly doing so outside CSDP structures. France is the main driver of this change . Rather than spending time working to obtain an agreement that may never come, it prefers to work pragmatically with volunteer European countries with sufficient capabilities--with the additional advantage of not automatically excluding the United Kingdom (Brexit) and Denmark (opt-out).
Thus, Operation Agenor 37 ( * ) in the Strait of Hormuz, which is exactly the sort of mission for which the CSDP was created, remains a coalition of eight volunteer countries managed by France outside any NATO or EU institutional framework. Takuba 38 ( * ) is another example of an ad hoc coalition.
More flexible forms of coordination than those organised by the CSDP in its current definition and which nevertheless require EU approval can also be considered. By coordinating the assets of national navies present for other missions in a test area, the Gulf of Guinea, the 'Coordinated Maritime Presence' (CMP) 39 ( * ) illustrates this trend.
But ad hoc coordination has one major drawback: it means that some Member States, in particular Germany, cannot participate. While its desire to participate in military options is of course often tempered by its historical reluctance, Germany's rejection of these operations is constitutional before it is political : without a UN, NATO or EU mandate, Germany is legally prohibited from participating in an operation. This same type of legal obstacle is sometimes used by Spain (for example, for Takuba) and Italy.
(2) The possibility for automaticity in case of aggression
The work on the Strategic Compass seems to have led to a new consensus for the mutual assistance clause of Article 42.7 TEU, 40 ( * ) invoked only once, by France, following the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, leading to the mobilisation of some European partners in the Sahel. The use of this clause, rather than Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, of which it is a kind of replica, was an important political symbol (especially since simply invoking Article 222 TFEU 41 ( * ) would have been just as justified). But certain Member States remain adamantly opposed to any invocation of Article 42.7 TEU on the grounds that it duplicates Article 5 of NATO . 42 ( * )
Then, in 2019, the EEAS initiated a study of this article by organising prospection exercises--based on complex conventional and non-conventional crises--between Member States in order to identify a doctrine for a combined use of Articles 42.7 TEU and 222 TFEU. 43 ( * ) Thanks to these exercises, the same reluctant Members States may now be reassessing the benefit of the mutual aid clause in line with Article 5 if NATO does not want or will not act. Initially independent of the Compass, this reflection can only add to it.
(3) The avenue of facilitated consent
Unanimity on a 'turnkey' operation
Article 44 TEU allows the Council to ' entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task '.
Thus, we can imagine a Member State submitting an operation conceived with a few other partner Member States directly to the PSC , which would save significant time by avoiding the pre-studies and discussions between Member States needed to establish the concept for the operation. The non-paper coordinated by France on crisis management suggests undertaking such a reflection on using Article 44 of the treaty. On this basis, we can imagine approving an ad hoc operation like Takuba after the fact. 44 ( * )
CSDP support reduced to ' bricks of cooperation ' for greater flexibility
Another avenue, supported by French authorities, is that of 'bricks' of cooperation that the CSDP could provide to a national operation, an ad hoc European cooperation such as Takuba or Agenor, or a NATO or UN operation. Whenever an EUTM mission is working in the same direction as a national or ad hoc operation, it would be normal for it to be able to contribute. We can imagine interactions between EUTM Mali and Barkhane or Takuba.
The non-paper on crisis management coordinated by France suggests that logistics, transport, medical support or strategic communication capabilities could be provided in common for national or European operations taking place in the same theatre of operations.
(4) The avenue of bypassing institutions: EII and other initiatives
Outside the CSDP and the European Union, we should mention the European Intervention Initiative (EII), whose 13 members participate in various working groups. Their studies enrich the European Union and NATO while encouraging a shared strategic culture . The EII strengthens both institutions by improving their members' ability to act together militarily and by giving rise to concrete projects, notably in the framework of PESCO. The EII is also welcome in that it allows the United Kingdom to be involved in spite of Brexit and Denmark in spite of its opt-out.
There are other multinational initiatives in Europe, many of which aim to establish a rapid reaction force (as we shall see, the Strategic Compass gives hope of success in this area) that could intervene urgently to maintain or restore peace in the event of a crisis outside EU territory, instead of ad hoc coalitions.
First, there is the Eurocorps , one of the first attempts at a European rapid reaction force. Established in 1992 at the initiative of France and Germany and comprising five Member States (France, Germany, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg), Eurocorps is an army corps-level military staff based in Strasbourg that is intended to command up to 60,000 troops in EU or NATO operations. It participates in the rotating duty rosters of both the EU BGs (see below) and the NATO Response Force (NRF). 45 ( * ) Eurocorps has been engaged in NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and in EU missions in Mali and the Central African Republic.
There is also the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), established in 2014, 46 ( * ) and the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), established in the framework of the Lancaster House agreements (see below). Finally, there is the Franco-German Brigade (FGB), created in 1989. This binational unit comprised of 5,600 troops--40% French and 60% German--intervened as part of the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR), in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Kosovo (KFOR). From October 2018 to April 2019, the FGB was deployed in Mali, but by separating the French, dedicated to Operation Barkhane, considered as highly lethal, and the Germans, who were included in Minusma and EUTM-Mali.
(5) The avenue of a hard core: a European Security Council?
Many Member States such as Poland, the Baltic States, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands (and the UK before Brexit) are strongly opposed to the idea of a European defence, while countries with a tradition of neutrality, notably Ireland and Austria, are reluctant to support any European military action, even external. If European states find it difficult to move forward together in the field of crisis management and defence, then the issue may arise of forming a "vanguard", a kind of "Eurogroup of defence" outside the CSDP framework .
This possibility, which Angela Merkel has presented several times as a 'European Security Council', was ultimately supported by Emmanuel Macron, as demonstrated by their joint declaration on 19 June 2018, known as the Meseberg Declaration. In the words of one of its recitals, the two States commit to: ' look into new ways of increasing the speed and effectiveness of the EU's decision making in [their] Common Foreign and Security Policy '. They feel we ' need a European debate on new formats , such as an EU Security Council and means of closer coordination, within the EU and in external fora ' .
A new format could be all the more useful given the European Council's poor performance in its role as the supreme body in strategic matters. As its attention is focused on internal affairs, its consequently few interventions in foreign policy tend to result in decisions taken in reaction to immediate events (pronouncement of sanctions, managing migration risks), without developing a strategic vision. In the Council of the EU, the Defence Ministers meet only once every six months in a minor format dependent on the Foreign Affairs Ministers' formats. Finally, in the European Parliament, defence is relegated to a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
This could lead to the emergence of a genuine strategic political body with a limited format that is capable of specifying what its objectives are : crisis management, collective defence, or both. Decisions could be taken by qualified majority (except for force deployment), it would theoretically be possible to include the British. Thereafter, each Member State could join an original core group, which could be the E4, whenever it wishes.
c) Improvements within easy reach
(1) Improve mission quality
- The three current EUTMs, 47 ( * ) which comprise all the current non-executive military missions , are not fulfilling all their respective expectations in Mali, CAR and Somalia. Increasingly fewer forces are being generated there despite training efforts, so much so that some observers wonder what is happening to those contingents, who may be returning to civilian occupations. The main problem is that these forces are neither trained nor equipped by the EUTM . More generally, the training process should be revisited, starting from the most basic organisation - for example, washing themselves and raising the flag in the morning - to recruitment, combat and retirement.
Strategic reviews of CSDP crisis management instruments and missions take place approximately every six months. Mostly undisclosed, they regret a lack of Member State participation, qualified staff and robust mandates .
• The results of civilian missions also fell short of expectations. Despite the explicit recommendations for a 'compact' 48 ( * ) adopted two years ago , the Member States are still far from assigning their best people to them, with the result that their expertise is highly unsatisfactory in relation to needs .
However, in the Sahel, everyone has seen that military success is an illusion as long as the functioning of civilian institutions is deficient. The provision of adequate staff to fulfil civilian mandates is therefore a real concern. Perhaps we should think about a European civilian reserve of specially trained units that could be deployed rapidly.
In any case, improving the quality of civilian and military missions would certainly help improve results which, as they stand, do not provide sufficient incentives for Member States to initiate new ones . Under another angle, in Africa, some of the shortfalls of our missions are becoming even more problematic, given that Russia, China, and even Turkey are now increasingly acting as rivals.
(2) Accelerating force generation: finally a legacy for EU BGs?
• The time needed for force generation under CSDP is still a handicap.
European aspirations for a rapid reaction force date back to the intervention force defined in 1999 at the Helsinki Council. Modelled on SFOR (the NATO stabilisation force deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1999), this force would have been comprised of 60,000 troops that could be mobilised in 60 days and operational for at least one year, making it capable of carrying out all the Petersberg tasks (see above). But this 'headline goal', set for 2003, has never been achieved.
In 2004, the Union adopted the 'Headline Goal 2010', which led in 2006 to the European Union Battlegroups (EUBGs) for military interventions under the CSDP.
Each battlegroup is comprised of at least 1,500 troops, excluding support. It must be deployable within 15 days for an initial mission duration of 30 days, extendable up to 120 days. The system provides for two battlegroups to be on standby per half year , totalling four per year. Battlegroups are trained and certified in the months leading up to going on standby.
But the EU BGs have never been deployed. Furthermore, they are not always functional , 49 ( * ) unlike NATO's reaction force, which is directly comparable. This state of affairs, the subject of regular regret , has political, technical and financial explanations.
Several measures could help to make the battlegroups operational: extending the duration of the standby periods from six months to one year, calibrating the resources made available by the Member States, which are too loose in this respect, and allowing them to be financed by the EPF 50 ( * ) (see below).
• Removing the logjam could also, through the Strategic Compass, be part of a more general approach to solving the problem of speed in deploying operations. Within the framework of the non-paper dedicated to crisis management coordinated by France, a small majority of Member States supported, at this stage, the permanent availability of a "first entry force", mentioned above, comprising 5,000 military personnel with land, air and sea components subject to joint training. The battlegroups could form its core , and certain staff also be shared with the forces made available to the United Nations or NATO . Josep Borrell supports the establishment of such a force. This target of 5,000 troops may, in itself, prove to be the best acceptable balance between Member States' actual resources (which, while the target may seem small in comparison, it is not insignificant) and their low level of determination towards the CSDP, compared to which the target does not seem out of reach.
• In addition, the German Ministry of Defence initiated the EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC) PESCO project , in which France is involved. This project explores different scenarios for assembling existing intervention forces 51 ( * ) in order to achieve a coherent "Full Spectrum Force Package" (FSFP), which would facilitate and accelerate force formation when the EU decides to launch an operation. The EUFOR CROC project is very interesting from the perspective of accelerating force generation, but it tends to focus on scenarios at the lower end of the spectrum. 52 ( * )
(3) Better funding for missions: the European Peace Facility (EPF)
Civilian missions are financed from the EU budget ('CFSP' budget). External military operations , on the other hand, are financed through an ad hoc pooling mechanism covering certain common costs . This was the 'Athena' mechanism until it was replaced by the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021. The rest of the expenses are directly covered by the Member States through their material and human contributions to the operation.
• Decided by the Council of the European Union on 18 December 2020, the EPF should:
- allow certain common costs of EU military missions for crisis management carried out within the CSDP, by absorbing and reinforcing the Athena mechanism 53 ( * ) ,
- encourage cooperation and military assistance . In particular, the EPF:
• extends to all regional organisations an initiative that was previously limited to the African Union (AU) through the African Peace Facility (APF) , which has been replaced by the EPF, 54 ( * )
• now allows third States to receive military support outside the framework of a regional organisation--which would permit support for the G5 Sahel, for example,
• now allows the EU to provide military equipment, even of a lethal nature, to its partners .
With €5 billion allocated for the 2021-2027 period outside the Union's ordinary budget, the EPF is still funded by direct annual allocations from EU Member States.
The EPF has passed a significant milestone with the possibility of providing direct military aid, including of a lethal nature. Thus, it will help to properly equip the armies trained within the EUTM framework. A sensitive and controversial subject, the provision of weapons relies on the principle of ' constructive abstention ': when the Council wants to transfer weapons to a partner, hesitant countries can abstain without blocking a decision that must theoretically be adopted unanimously. 55 ( * )
The EPF should be mobilised during the second half of 2021.
THE AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY (APF) AND THE CBSD TOOL
• Created in 2004 using the European Development Fund, the APF was established at a time when many Europeans and NGOs were opposed to the idea of cooperation and development budgets supporting military units. This is why the APF operates in a 'grey area' : it cannot provide lethal military aid or fund military salaries, but it can fund transportation, communications and command equipment, living expenses for soldiers on mission, and their bonuses. Originally allocated €250 million, the APF later met with a certain success, reaching a cumulative €3.5 billion over the 2004-2019 period, 93% of which concerned peace support operations (PSO).
• Created in 2017, the CBSD tool ('Capacity Building in support of Security and Development') widened the range of civilian actions available to the EU by allowing it to finance certain types of training within a limited framework, as well as equipment and infrastructure intended for troops.
• Result : most of the AU-led peace operations over the past 15 years would not have been possible without the APF , which has allowed the EU to increase its role in security cooperation. But it did not allow for the provision of military equipment . Furthermore, it excluded military cooperation with a third country since the APF can only support peace operations led by the AU or regional African organisations mandated by the AU. Finally, the CBSD tool, which is also a development aid, has not been able to meet more of the EU's needs in terms of military supplies .
It should be noted that a Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) is being set up in parallel; this new major cooperation and development programme merges several instruments and will now fund the civilian interventions of the APF as well as those of the CBSD (see previous box), all of which are civilian in nature.
(4) Europeanise military command
(i) The first steps towards a European command with the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)
Until 2017, the command of CSDP military operations relied on the NATO military command structure or a national military staff. The lack of a European command was a shortcoming that the Council, on 8 June 2017, wanted to overcome by establishing the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) , which is part of the EEAS.
Thus, for the command of CSDP military operations, it is possible to employ either:
- the 'Berlin Plus' agreements , which allow the use of the NATO command structure 56 ( * ) in a spirit of non-duplication of structures, and has already happened twice, for Macedonia and Bosnia (where Operation Althea, although not very active, is still underway and therefore still requires this structure); it seems that using these agreements is currently unlikely for a new hypothetical operation in the future, 57 ( * )
- an ' autonomous European Union operation ' that relies on a national military staff , chosen for each operation from among five eligible Member States. 58 ( * ) In this military staff, the operation commander reports to the PSC and supervises the force commander for the theatre of operations. Since the State chosen is different for each operation, here we regret the significant 'cost of entry' due to the time needed to become familiar with how the relevant European instances function,
- or, since 2017, the MPCC for non-executive military operations . The officer at the head of the MPCC is the operation commander; they report to the PSC and, similarly, supervise the theatre force commander. As a precursor to an EU armed forces headquarters, the MPCC 's goal is to reinforce reactivity, efficiency and coherence in the EU's reaction. After a "phase 1" that ended in 2020, the objective was for it to be able to assume responsibility at the strategic level for the planning and operational conduct of military CSDP missions with a 'non-executive mandate' , i.e. non-combatant mandate, as well as for a small executive operation focused on land--the equivalent of a battlegroup. Today, the three EUTMs , i.e. all the missions with a non-executive mandate, are headed by the MPCC .
(ii) The methods for a balanced increase in power
• Despite a uniformly positive assessment of services rendered, the MPCC's human and material situation still does not allow it to fully assume its role : positions remain vacant 59 ( * ) and the infrastructure is deficient, especially the lack of a secure information and communication system. 60 ( * ) This shortcoming, which we can criticise for all European bodies, requires using non-interoperable national resources to conduct operations. Furthermore, the MPCC does not have the resources, particularly logistics, which military planning staffs typically have to facilitate operations.
However, the MPCC has planned to move in 2022 into a suitable building that includes civil command, the EUMS, and the civil intelligence centre. With further improvements expected, in particular in the information and communication system, it seems that the head of the EUMS will be able to declare the full operational capability (FOC) of "Phase 1" of the MPCC at the end of 2021 , i.e. one year later than the initial target.
• Secondly, it could be beneficial to extend the MPCC's scope to executive military missions 61 ( * ) and thus have a planning staff - in other words, an 'OHQ' 62 ( * ) - for all military missions , with the staffs commanding operations Irini or Atalanta returning to the MPCC. This change would correct a shortcoming that helps explain the disappointing performance of the CSDP, among other things.
Sometimes there are objections based on the principle of non-duplication 63 ( * ) of NATO command structures, often reiterated when organising the EU's security and defence. But, apart from the fact that the CSDP focuses on crisis management and NATO more on defence, this is quantitatively a false problem : with a planning structure that could comprise perhaps a hundred officers, the EUMS cannot seriously be considered as duplicating a NATO integrated military structure comprising almost twenty times as many.
• While Germany and France both support extending the MPCC's role, which would avoid having to rely on Member States' commands, their approaches are different.
Today, both the EUMS--competent in matters of doctrine and capability development--and the MPCC are placed under the single authority of the EUMS Director-General, which has been French General Hervé Bléjean since 2020.
Most of our European partners, in particular Germany, want this MPCC to have its own military staff. They want to separate it from the EUMS with its own head--reporting directly to the PSC--which would conduct the European Union's executive and non-executive military operations.
For its part, France still prefers a robust and unified command architecture that covers the operations-doctrine-capability continuum . It has demonstrated the advantages of this at the national level where a single head, the CEMA (chief of the defence staff), heads both the military staff and the CPCO (centre for operation planning and conduct). Consequently, the CEMA has a comprehensive view of operations with feedback and is able to draw lessons for the doctrine and the consequences on capability. Similarly, NATO, with the same benefits in terms of visibility and scope of action, the SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe, currently General Tod Wolters) is the head of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe).
The day when the MPCC conducts all military operations (or even all civilian operations 64 ( * ) ), becoming a sort of 'mini-SHAPE', it will be highly legitimate in establishing capability needs. With an autonomous staff, military expertise within the EUMS would be split to such an extent that those responsible for developing capabilities would lose legitimacy. The risk would be that the DG DEFIS, by hiring its own military experts, would favour developing capabilities that may not necessarily meet the military needs observed through the European Union's operations.
That's why, in France, the CEMA constantly supports the unicity of the EUMS's and MPCC's command in order to find a good coherence in capability and a satisfactory balance between the Council and the Commission.
(5) Provide information to military command
European intelligence is very patchy. An operation must be able to be conducted as autonomously as possible, without relying on third States, such as the United States or Russia, for intelligence or on the one or two participating States that are best equipped. It is important that no one have outside views imposed on them.
In this regard, the French non-paper on crisis management calls for an improvement in the European Union's autonomous assessment capabilities. It supports using the EU's electronic intelligence tools, including SatCen (the satellite image analysis centre based in Torrejon, near Madrid), and increasing information gathering capabilities. The end goal is to improve decision-making.
d) Establish a more broadly helpful cluster dedicated to defence?
Spread throughout the EU's military structures (EUMS and MPCC) that report to the EEAS, troops represent a small share of its personnel--around 250 for a staff of 4,500--which undermines the prospect for a homogeneous defence cluster. The EEAS is essentially comprised of diplomats and is naturally focused on foreign policy. This configuration is not optimal: most States would never conceive of having their defence and military policy decided by a foreign affairs ministry. Thus, it is preferable, in accordance with France's position during the EEAS's creation, to avoid placing military structures within it, but have them report to the President of the European Council .
In any case, a stronger military capability in a homogeneous staff and better identified as a lever of information, expertise and action - which could result from a more powerful MPCC within the EUMS - would demonstrate strong potential for other EU policies. For example, once there is a community responsibility for air security, it would be normal for military staff to provide their skills. Similarly, in case of nuclear or bacteriological catastrophe, military staff would likely to be able to contribute and provide significant expertise. Humanitarian actions could also be concerned. Such contributions, which would assume building bridges between military crisis management and the Commission, could also reduce mistrust among the Member States who most oppose European defence developments.
But careful! The trendy objective of 'resilience' should not justify a generalised instrumentalisation of the defence apparatus, in particular based on a misguided analysis of the health crisis , by pursuing ideas that would lead to recommending that troops distribute masks or build hospitals for Europe's citizens, for example.
We must reject any attempt to withdraw the military inside the borders to take on a general, central security role, which would durably distance them from their primary purpose, leading to losses in availability, skills and, no doubt, careers . Only special circumstances can justify their involvement, which must remain exceptional and continue to fall within the scope of their profession. The fight against terrorism depends on it, as France has shown with Operation Sentinelle.
* 21 the Common Security and Defence Policy.
* 22 Nevertheless, these recent cooperation projects, which are very structural, are experiencing shocks which raise the question of whether there really is a 'Franco-German engine' for European defence. Indeed, Germany willingly sees its relationships with EU countries within a multilateral framework by seeking to include other countries in the above-mentioned projects. From Berlin's perspective, the Franco-German relationship appears less exclusive than it does in Paris, not least because of the Framework Nations Concept (FNC), through which Germany maintains close relations with the Netherlands, Poland and other Central European countries.
* 23 EU opt-outs are exceptions to the principle that EU law applies in all 27 Member States. Member States that benefit from one may decide to end it.
* 24 Poland makes an air fleet available to NATO, but just one plane available to the EU.
* 25 Even within this framework, according to certain observers.
* 26 The Allies agreed to increase their national defence spending to a minimum of 2% of GDP at the Riga Summit in 2006. This became a tangible commitment in September 2014 at the NATO summit in Newport, Wales, after the years of crisis between 2008 and 2012 had resulted in significant cuts in budgets and capabilities. The Wales Summit Declaration on the transatlantic relationship, for example, called for Allies to spend 2% of GDP on military spending (excluding pensions) within 10 years, with 20% of that spending to be devoted to investment and innovation.
* 27 The Decision states in the fifth paragraph of Article 3, which concerns the conditions under which a third State may participate in a PESCO project: 'its participation must not lead to dependencies on that third State or to restrictions imposed by it against any Member State of the Union, as regards armament procurement, research and capability development, or on the use and export of arms or capabilities and technology, which would hamper progress or prevent the usability, whether joint or otherwise, the export or the operational deployment of the capability developed in the PESCO project'
* 28 The EDA, as an intergovernmental body, takes decisions on a unanimous basis.
* 29 There may be a line not to cross in recommending that the CDP stick to obtaining the capabilities listed in the Progress Catalogue, given the CSDP's current ambitions and the sincerity of capability reports.
* 30 However, merging the two processes is impossible, because the objectives are not the same: a capability process seeks to build a military apparatus, and this is not the same for managing crises external to Europe as for collective defence on Europe's territory. Even if they one day are, a single planning, which would take into account the United States here but not there, would remain inconceivable.
* 31 'Embedding EU military capability development processes in national defence planning processes and make best use of EU defence initiatives.'
* 32 Meaning that combat forces are made available.
* 33 In general, decisions on CSDP matters are taken unanimously in the European Council or the Council of the European Union.
* 34 It can reach around 15% of expenses.
* 35 These factors undoubtedly contributed for the latest mission being set up in Mozambique: an EUTM mission that was agreed in principle in May 2021 and could be operational by the end of 2021.
* 36 However, the last operation, initiated by Portugal for Mozambique (see above), was decided within a reasonable timeframe. But it is too early to speak of a trend reversal.
* 37 Agenor, the military component of the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH), aims to enhance the capability for situational awareness and surveillance of maritime activity, as well as to ensure freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. France is the framework nation for Agenor, which reached full operational capability in February 2020.
* 38 Initiated in July 2020 to supplement Barkhane, Takuba brings together the special forces of other Member States.
* 39 The CMP is a pilot project stopped by the EU in January 2021 and included France, Spain, Italy and Portugal. By carrying out joint manoeuvres with the navies of neighbouring countries, the CMP is tasked with fighting piracy and other missions.
* 40 Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty is the mutual defence clause of the Treaty on European Union (this article derives from Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty, which created the WEU). It stipulates that: ' If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter [which sets out the conditions of legitimate defence] . This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.' In speaking of 'Member States' and not EU institutions, it allows for dialogue and direct support from country to country, rather than involving European institutions that can be cumbersome.
This article was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty at the initiative of those EU Member States that support a greater role for the EU in defence matters (notably Greece, which, while protected by the mutual defence clause of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, wished to introduce an additional level of defence, bearing in mind that Turkey, its long-standing rival, remains its ally in NATO).
* 41 'The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.'
* 42 The 'non-duplication' principle, of which Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spoke on 8 December 1998 to her European partners as part of the '3D rule' (for non-decoupling, non-duplication and non-discrimination) for the relationship between European defence and NATO, is regularly brought up as a common-sense argument. But, while this principle is justified in terms of optimising military spending, it also tends to be an obstacle to developing and implementing an autonomous European security and defence policy.
* 43 'The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.'
* 44 Such a possibility would nevertheless only have limited benefit, given that Denmark is already scheduled to participate in 2022 and that France wants to keep the option of including the United Kingdom--both countries that do not participate in the CSDP.
* 45 The NATO Response Force is a multinational joint NATO force, created in 2002 and reinforced in 2014 by the establishment of a "Very High Readiness Joint Task Force" (VJTF), commanded by Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR).
* 46 Created under the initiative of the United Kingdom, it brings together Northern European countries: the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and the three Baltic States. It was declared fully operational in July 2018.
* 47 European Union Training Mission
* 48 On 19 November 2018, the Council and the Member States adopted conclusions on the establishment of a civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) compact . These conclusions set out the strategic guidelines for strengthening civilian CSDP and contain 22 political commitments made by the Council and the Member States.
* 49 In 2021, the schedule remained empty in the first half of the year, and in the second half of the year, only one battlegroup was functional, led by Italy as the framework nation alongside Austria, Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia (Hapsburg battlegroup). Similarly, in 2022, the schedule remained empty in the first half of the year; for the second half of the year, Spain confirmed its commitment as the framework nation of the battlegroup, with the participation of Portugal (Iberian battlegroup).
* 50 In June 2017, EU leaders did consider taking over the deployment of the battlegroups as a common cost under the Athena mechanism, but ultimately no decision was taken.
* 51 A project adopted during the first wave of PESCO projects in March 2018.
* 52 Germany's traditionally reserved attitude in military matters can explain this. With this in mind, Germany and France likely did not have the same degree of conviction when they signed the non-paper supporting the first entry force of 5,000 troops.
* 53 A mechanism whereby all Member States participating in the CSDP (all except Denmark) pay an annual contribution based on their gross national income for expenses not directly related to military activities, such as soldiers' accommodation, fuel or certain staff operating expenses, which can represent up to 15% of a mission's total budget .
* 54 The Council of the EU, which is competent for the CFSP and CSDP, will therefore be responsible for the EPF, whereas the Commission played an important role for the APF, as it was an instrument for cooperation and development.
* 55 At the same time, there is a mechanism for reluctant Member States to avoid paying for any weapons. Their contribution to the EPF is not reduced but redirected to less sensitive activities.
* 56 The 'Berlin Plus' agreements, adopted on 17 March 2003, laid the foundations for EU-NATO cooperation on the basis of a 'Strategic Partnership for Crisis Management' and set up a 'permanent cell for planning and conducting EU civilian and military operations without recourse to NATO resources'. To conduct a CSDP operation in this framework, it was not possible to rely on SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), who is always American. Thus, it was decided that it would be their deputy, D-SACEUR. But the D-SACEUR is British. Since Brexit, this poses an obvious problem (see the British partnership below), but which has few practical consequences at this stage (see following note).
* 57 Indeed, it has become difficult to use Berlin Plus, since Turkey requires Cyprus to leave the room for Berlin Plus. Furthermore, Berlin Plus negotiations are very slow.
* 58 For example, Spanish command for Atalanta, Italian for Irini. French command in Mont Valérien was last used for the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation (2007-2009).
* 59 Phase 1 requires a fixed team of 60 people, to which must be added 50 people for executive missions. After four years, in June 2021, the availability of additional staff was secured, but the number of staff had reached a ceiling of 47 people out of 60.
* 60 In this regard, a non-paper from France and the Baltic States insists on the primary importance of improving communication and information security within institutions as well as between institutions and theatres of operations.
* 61 In 2017, this was impossible due to a British veto. A yet-to-be-agreed phase 2 is already planned, after which the MPCC should be capable of commanding a major inter-army executive operation.
* 62 Operational Headquarters, another way of referring to an operational planning staff (to conduct, plan and organise military missions). An MPCC in the role of OHQ would be placed between the EUMS, which deals with concepts at the European level, and the headquarters that commands the operation on the ground, plans and manages logistics and transport, ensures force generation, organises rotations, etc.
* 63 See note above.
* 64 As an aside, Germany supports the merging of civilian management (currently under the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, CPCC ) with military crisis management (MPCC), which has the benefit of coherence but could ultimately affect the level of ambition.